There is some serious shit happening in Ukraine right now. But the press has fallen back on its tried and true "we are all going to die" approach to the situation. Things are more complicated than the "it's a done deal that Putin is going to invade" line they are pushing. So, let's take a more nuanced view of the proceedings. Let's start with a thumbnail history lesson.
Ukraine has been within the Russian sphere of influence for so long that it's not worth considering a time when it wasn't. Russia suffered horribly in World War I, and a hundred years before that, in the Napoleonic Wars. The communists that successfully engineered a takeover of the government late in the War were painfully aware of that history. When they consolidated power, they set out to do something about it.
The standard method for dealing with this particular problem is to assemble a group of buffer states, all the countries that surround you. That's what Lenin and the rest of the leaders of Russia did. They created something called the USSR - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On paper it was similar to the modern European Union, a bunch of countries with shared interests that banded together. Yet each country within the union remained a sovereign state.
But, unlike with the European Union, with the USSR, the appearance that it operated in a similar manner was a not so carefully maintained fiction. In reality, Russia ran the show, and the rest of the "independent" states were just vassals who took their marching orders from Moscow. This was apparent to anyone who made the least effort to investigate. What's important for the matter at hand is that Ukraine was one of those vassals.
Then World War II came along. It proved that Russia needed buffer states. But the buffer state strategy was ineffective at stopping the Nazis, or even slowing them down significantly. So, from a Russian security perspective, the whole plan was an utter failure. But the plan conferred other benefits upon Russia, so they stuck with it after the War. In fact, they stuck with it for as long as they could.
But let's stick with the World War II period for a bit longer. In Europe there was the "western" front and the "eastern" front. Most people in the west think the western front was where all the important action occurred. That gets it backwards. It was 60-40 or 70-30, with the eastern front seeing the largest and ultimately most decisive fighting. The largest tank battle in history was fought on the eastern front.
The activities of Nazi General Rommel and his "Afrika Corps" are much more familiar to people who live in the west than anything that happened on the eastern front. And the battle for control of north Africa involved several tank battles that are usually described by western experts as both as large and as critical to the successful prosecution of the War.
But the number of tanks involved on both sides were a small fraction of those active on either side of several clashes that took place on the eastern front. Ukraine's position between Germany and Russia put it smack dab in the middle of the eastern front. And smack dab in the middle of the fighting.
Russia was on the winning side of the War, so the USSR emerged intact. And Ukraine and the other non-Russian members of the USSR remained vassals beholden to their masters in Moscow. The situation, however, did not remain static forever. Russia eventually declined and became unable to hold the USSR together. It fell apart in the late 1980s. And the internet became a big thing shortly thereafter.
The fall of Russia and the advent of the internet allowed Ukrainians to get a good look at the west for the first time in generations. Ukrainians decided that they liked what they saw much better than continuing to be bound to the Russian orbit. But for a while longer that didn't matter. Russia managed to engineer a series of pro-Russia governments in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. Then they put an especially inept and corrupt figurehead in place.
The Ukrainians decided enough was enough and got rid of him. By 2014 a new, democratically elected government was in power. But it was weak because it was new, and because it hadn't had much time to throw out many of the holdover crooks and incompetents. Putin, who spent decades as a KGB agent, saw his chance and took it.
He annexed a part of Ukraine called Crimea. Geography made it relatively easy for Russia to invade, and hard for Ukraine to defend. The whole thing took less than a week. After that Ukraine had no practical chance of getting it back. "That went very well", was Putin's thinking. The whole invasion had been practically bloodless. It hadn't cost Russia much treasure either. The west had no real way to help, so they were forced to accept it as a fait accompli.
That encouraged Putin. So, he picked out a part of Ukraine that bordered Russia and that contained a high percentage of Russian speaking people. As a result of the language commonality, and other factors, many, but not all, of the residents of that region had strong cultural ties to Russia.
Putin set about manufacturing an "independent" army. It consisted almost entirely of Russian troops. But this was disguised by having the soldiers strip all Russian insignias, and other identifying devices, off of their uniforms. Theoretically, their affiliation could no longer be determined. This "independent army" invaded and was able to capture a significant amount of territory. When asked, Pusin said "not us - we had nothing to do with it".
This is what used to be called "plausible deniability". The denial is really not plausible. But supporters can latch on to it and pretend they believe it. From a practical point of view, Ukraine was still too weak to push them out. And again, the west was not in a position to do much, so the Russians are still there. Sporadic low-level fighting continues in the area to this day.
And that brings us to the present, actually a few months ago. I am not expert enough to be able to say with any degree of certainty why Putin decided it was time to attempt his next move against Ukraine. But we all now know that he decided the time was ripe to try to get away with something.
He started by slowly massing what is usually reported as "100,000 or more" Russian soldiers near the border to Ukraine. They are equipped with tanks, airplanes, and the rest of the usual accoutrements of a modern first-class military force. No secret has been made of their presence. A force that large cannot be hidden from satellites.
The satellite photos were leaked to the usual cast of characters in the press. They got the word out and extensive press coverage commenced. Press and public interest has remained high since. The unanimous opinion of the "experts" the press uses is that "Putin can invade at any time and there is nothing we can do to stop it." So, the press breathlessly tells us to "be afraid - be very afraid".
The press loves a "war is about to break out" story. They have lots of experience covering it, and it is good for ratings. So, beyond interminably rehashing the few actual facts, they trot out "expert" after "expert".
These "experts" know that they will receive more follow-on bookings if they push the "it's bad - very, very bad" narrative. That narrative inevitably leads to a "the Administration is screwing it up" narrative. The fact that the expert du jour is not in charge can allow for no other possible conclusion.
And, of course, they can choose between the "he's not doing enough" and the "he's doing too much" narratives. You can get "dramatic" TV (i.e. good ratings) by pitting an "expert" from one camp against an "expert" from the other camp. They start from their shared belief that the administration is getting it all wrong and go from there. As entertainment, that's great. As a way of informing the public, it's terrible.
The one thing they do get right is that Putin is the key player in all of this. He longs for the good old days when Russia was the USSR. And, more importantly, for the time when Russia was one of only two superpowers.
For decades Russia was able to successfully masquerade as a superpower without actually being one. It never had the economic base necessary to move from perception to reality. It was always faking it. It had a lot of success faking it. But eventually economic reality caught up with it. As the '80s played out, it lost the ability to maintain the fiction. Shortly thereafter, the facade came tumbling down.
Currently, the big-three economic powers are the USA, China, and India. Russia is Saudi Arabia with more land and a much larger population. They do have an educated populace and a large economic base. But only if you compare Russia to Saudi Arabia and not to India or China.
Just creating and maintaining the fiction that Russia is a great power takes money. Russia does well when the price of oil is high and badly when it is low. COVID drove down economic activity worldwide. That drove the demand for oil down. That drove the price of oil down. That starved Russia of the resources necessary to fund Putin's ambition.
But Russia does have a few things going for it. The biggest one is the fact that it supplies much of the oil and natural gas that Europe consumes. That money fuels Putin's ambitions. It also gives Putin leverage. He can threaten to cut off the flow of the large amount of oil and natural gas that Russia exports.
Putin is smart. But he is also an opportunist and a bully. If he sees an opportunity, he will take it. He actually cut off Ukraine's access to natural gas for a while a few years ago. He saw the opportunity to bully Ukraine and took it. The cut off allowed him to extract significant concessions from Ukraine. While he is constantly on the hunt for opportunities, he is also no fool. He only goes forward if he is confident of success.
He has decided for a number of reasons that now is the time to try to make another move on Ukraine. It is right next door. And, besides the gas cutoff ploy, in 2014 he got away with two other ploys aimed at Ukraine. Now might be a good time, his thinking goes, to pull off another 2014 and take another bite out of Ukraine.
If he succeeds it makes him look strong and like someone who is a powerful player on the world stage. And, who knows. Maybe he can take over the entire country of Ukraine. Even if he only succeeds in installing a puppet government in Kiev, or taking another small bite out of Ukraine, either would count as a win.
In any case, he decided to find out just how much he can now get away with. If you listen to much of the U.S. press, it will be a slam dunk, an easy win for him. And they may be right. But I think there is a significant chance that they are wrong. The basic reason is that conditions have changed.
The most important change is the one that has taken place in Ukraine. During the USSR period a case could be made that, as a practical matter, Ukraine didn't even exist. People living in what is now Ukraine knew they might as well have been living in Russia. There was a Ukrainian government, but it existed in name only. Under those circumstances, thinking of yourself as a Ukrainian because you lived in Ukraine didn't mean much.
But in the period since 2014, Ukrainians have been seeing what a home-grown independent government looks like and acts like. They like what they see. They like being Ukrainians, an entirely distinct species from Russians. And whatever pre-existing ire there was toward Russia has only increased in recent years. Besides being home-grown, the Ukrainian government has shown itself to be both trustworthy and reasonably competent.
A big part of that is thanks to the Ukrainian military. The continuous military pressure that Russia has exerted on the country has had the perverse, from the Russian perspective, result of forcing Ukraine to develop and field a top-quality military.
Anything less would have allowed the Russians to run rough shod over them. Ukraine had no real military capability when Russia made its moves in 2014. That is no longer true. The important question is, does Putin know this? I think he does.
Next, the west was caught flat footed in 2014. Putin's moves were entirely unexpected. Western intelligence and military people are not making that mistake this time around. Let's say Putin had snuck his force up to the Ukrainian border and launched a blitzkrieg before anyone caught on. Then the west would again be confronted with a fait accompli.
But, for whatever reason, the buildup was slow enough that it showed up on threat boards all over the west well before Putin could put it to use. It may be that it just takes more time to assemble a force this large. It may also be that since 2014 western intelligence agencies have been on high alert and, therefore, watching the region closely. Whatever move Putin makes this time around will be one that the whole world will be on the lookout for.
The military experts agree that, if Putin is willing to pay the price, he has the military capability to invade the country and seize control of all of it. I am not sure that is true. The conclusion is based on the usual military analysis. You take a head count of the two forces, the Ukrainian military and the force that Putin has assembled. Then you look at the equipment of the two forces. The Russians have more equipment and more capable equipment.
Finally, you do the military math. All the experts say the result is that Putin wins. The people performing the calculation are competent. If they say that's what should happen, then I trust their math. But there is an implicit assumption that the experts are making. And I am not sure that implicit assumption is justified.
There is a term of art called a "Potemkin Village". It comes from Russian history. In this particular instance Russia needed to look strong when it was actually weak. It didn't have the resources to build up its strength. Instead, it built a bunch of what appeared to be villages. If the villages had been real, then Russia might indeed have been formidable. But, until the villages were exposed as fakes, which they eventually were, the ploy worked. At a minimum, the ploy bought Russia time it otherwise wouldn't have had.
Russians have been making their military look larger and more powerful than it actually is forever. In the USSR era they would have a few airplanes fly in a circle so that they could overfly Red Square repeatedly during the annual May Day parade. Western observers would then overestimate the number of top-of-the-line planes Russia possessed. And it wasn't just planes. They used the same trick with other types of equipment.
We know that there are a lot of Russian soldiers near the Ukrainian border. We know that there is a lot of what looks like first class Russian equipment positioned near the Ukranian border. But what kind of shape are either really in?
One thing that I find interesting is that the press routinely shows us a mixture of training video that Russia has released and satellite photos of large numbers of parked vehicles. But when it comes to the videos, all Russia needs to make them is a few first-class units. As to the satellite shots, see above. And then there is this.
Satellite imagery allows western experts to count vehicles. But I noticed that some of the recent satellite photos of the Russian buildup feature hundreds of vehicles covered in snow. If they are ready to go at a moment's notice, why are they covered in snow?
Let me be clear. I don't know what the state of readiness of the Russian forces is. It might be high. Or it might not be. U.S. and allied intelligence agencies might know the answer. Putin should know the answer. It is a failing in the press coverage to not consider the possibility that there is a considerable amount of Russian fakery going on.
So, where are we? The Ukrainians are a tougher nut to crack now than they were in 2014. The western powers are on the alert. It can be argued that they should be providing more military equipment, and more capable military equipment to the Ukrainians than they are. But they are providing substantial amounts of military equipment. And the Russians may be far less capable than western experts give them credit for.
But wait, there's more. His KGB training inclines Putin toward indirect means. How about a propaganda offensive? How about sowing division behind enemy lines? How about Cyber? How about any number of other techniques for reducing the cost and increasing the chance of success?
This is an area where the press is doing a good job. We have seen all kinds of stories about these, and other possible dirty tricks. Some have come out of the U.S. Some have come out of the U.K. I believe one of them even came out of France.
This is a case of "forewarned is forearmed". Putin might come up with something no one has thought of. But many of the plays in the KGB playbook have received widespread coverage in the western press. That doesn't render them impotent. But it does reduce their effectiveness.
Finally, it is important to understand that Putin is getting something he values highly right now. At the moment he is viewed as a powerful player on the world stage. People are paying attention to what he is saying. People are seriously concerned about what he is doing or what he might do in the future.
They are saying that what he might do will have wide ranging repercussions. In other words, for the moment he is getting the kind of attention that leaders of major powers capable of taking consequential actions get. That, he values highly.
The whole Ukraine game is about affecting Putin's thinking. If he thinks he can achieve success at low cost and low risk, he will move. Why wouldn't he? What the Biden Administration needs to do is reduce his estimation of his chances of success. Or they need to increase his estimation of the likely cost. Or both. They are doing a good job of that. If they are successful enough then Putin will slink away into the night.
If he ultimately ends up doing nothing, he will try to blur and obfuscate what he is doing. Do not expect the Russians to announce one day that they are packing up and leaving. Instead, expect diplomatic efforts to drag on ineffectually before slowly and quietly grinding to a halt. He will also make military and diplomatic moves designed to obscure what is really going on.
Eventually, he will need to do something definitive like withdraw lots of troops from Ukraine's border. He will try to find a time when the world is distracted by some event happening somewhere far distant from Ukraine and then do it. The whole crisis will end not with a bang but with a whimper.
In the meantime, Putin is getting what he wants. He is being treated as if he is a BFD. And, on his scorecard, that counts as a win, a big win.
